Why 1945 Was Not 1918
This paroxysm deserves a moment’s pause before turning the page toward reconciliation. The mechanism described in the first two installments of this series — humiliation, cultivated resentment, deferred revenge — operated one last time with devastating force in 1940: the deliberate choice of Rethondes, the echo of Bismarck’s words at Sedan, all of it suggests that Germany’s leaders at the time believed, quite consciously, that they were acting in direct continuity with 1870 and 1918. The cycle reproduced itself exactly as it had been designed to — all the way to its logical, appalling conclusion.

But 1945 differs from 1871 or 1918 in one essential respect: this time, there is no victor left in a position to humiliate the other without destroying itself in the process. France in 1945 lacked the means for a punitive peace comparable to Versailles — it emerged from the Occupation itself utterly exhausted. And Germany, confronted with the sheer scale of its own crimes, no longer had the same psychological ground on which to cultivate a new, legitimate sense of national grievance. It may be this double impossibility, more than any sudden surge of virtue, that opened the door — provided statesmen were able to seize it.