What the Numbers Say, Behind “the Gate of Grief” (Bab-el-Mandeb)
Three recent developments lend further, quantified, support to Admiral Girard’s analysis.
On the Houthis’ “offensive military potential”: Admiral Girard does not judge it negligible — he himself notes that it has been notably strengthened — but considers that it does not, as things stand, constitute the decisive strategic factor in the current situation, which remains dictated above all by political considerations. An investigation by the Conflict Armament Research Center documents precisely this build-up: the movement has quietly refined its arsenal over the past eighteen months, even as Iran and Saudi Arabia exhausted themselves in open warfare — more than 800 missile components seized, at least ten different types identified, with Iranian engineers sent to teach Houthi technicians to assemble the systems themselves rather than import complete missiles. Only 5% of these components came directly from Iran; the rest transited through sixteen other countries.

On the “strain on American resources” raised in connection with the midterm elections: American stockpiles of Patriot PAC-3 interceptor missiles are reported to have fallen from more than 2,300 units before the Iran war to roughly 800 today, according to CSIS — a drop of nearly two-thirds in six months. Axios notably names France among the countries drawing, alongside Israel and Ukraine, on this same already-strained American supply — which sheds a more concrete light on Europeans’ quiet reluctance to commit further.

Finally, on the Saudi resentment the admiral anticipates: the Times of Israel reported in recent days that Donald Trump explicitly refused a Saudi request for strikes against the Houthis, with American officials indicating a wish to “stay focused on Iran and Hormuz rather than open a new front” — despite two personal calls from Mohammed bin Salman. Riyadh thus finds itself, once again, having to rely on its own resources alone.